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Note
UNCLOS, but No Cigar: Overcoming Obstacles to
the Prosecution of Maritime Piracy
Ryan P. Kelley∗
They attack from beyond the horizon, approaching swiftly
behind their target ships in small outboard skiffs, firing volleys
of Kalashnikov rounds and rocket-propelled grenades to scare
their victim-crews into submission before boarding.1 When a
group of pirates manages to board another ship, the crew will
likely face a long ordeal before freedom comes again.2 This
modern scenario threatens lives, livelihoods, and global security, and no scholar or legal practitioner has yet proposed an effective solution to stem this violent tide.3 Although reminiscent
of Blackbeard or the dreaded Barbary hordes, maritime piracy
today—most notably off the shores of Somalia—exists in a legal
context that presents an entirely new set of challenges.
∗ M.A.L.D. Candidate 2012, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy; J.D.
Candidate 2011, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2005, Carleton College. The author would like to extend his sincere thanks to Professors Oren
Gross and Eugene Kontorovich for their invaluable guidance. Thank you also
to the hardworking and talented Editors of the Minnesota Law Review, especially Joseph Hansen, Theresa Nagy, and Daniel Schiff, for their valued contributions. The author’s humble thanks and gratitude for his supporting and
understanding family, and his indispensably divertive friends, hardly convey
the depth of his appreciation. Copyright © 2011 by Ryan P. Kelley.
1. Cf. Fergal Keane, British Captain’s Somali Pirate Nightmare, BBC
NEWS, Jan. 19, 2010, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8465770.stm.
2. See, e.g., Sarah Childress, Ship and Crew Are Docked; U.S. Navy Is in
Standoff with Pirates, WALL ST. J. ONLINE, Apr. 12, 2009, http://online.wsj
.com/article/SB123945093996811015.html?KEYWORDS=maersk+alabama; Jonah Fisher, Somali Pirate Patrol: Day One, BBC NEWS, Feb. 19, 2009, http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7899898.stm (“For [naval ships] to intervene[, they]
have to actually arrive as an act of piracy is taking place.”).
3. See Robert D. Kaplan, Op-Ed., Anarchy on Land Means Piracy at Sea,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2009, at WK9, available at 2009 WLNR 6839768; Nick
Childs, Navies Struggle with “Swarming” Pirates, BBC NEWS, Apr. 1, 2010,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8598726.stm; Muhyadin Ahmed Roble, Somalia: 11 Pirates Jailed 15 Years Each, AFR. NEWS, Feb. 15, 2010, http://www
.africanews.com/site/Somalia_11_pirates_jailed_15yrs_each/list_messages/30025.
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Pirates today share the legal designation of their historic
brethren as “enemies of all mankind,”4 which provides the historical justification for universal jurisdiction.5 However, the
modern international laws relating to piracy form an array of
overlapping and complex rules. The most significant treaty relating to piracy—the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS)—limits the exercise of jurisdiction over
suspected pirates transferred to a third-party state from the
state that captures them on the seas.6
Consequently, international law discourages many states
from combating this new wave of piracy because they have yet
to discover how to balance the various obligations and tools,
which they sometimes interpret as contradictory.7 Such uncertainty led to a standard practice of transferring captured pirates to nearby states for trial,8 or setting them free.9 Yet
UNCLOS provisions and drafting notes prohibit such practices,10 and appear to favor the jurisdictional claims of third-party
4. See Michael Bahar, Attaining Optimal Deterrence at Sea: A Legal and
Strategic Theory for Naval Anti-Piracy Operations, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L.
1, 28 (2007) (explaining that the Achille Lauro hijackers were hostis humani
generis).
5. Eugene Kontorovich, The Piracy Analogy: Modern Universal Jurisdiction’s Hollow Foundation, 45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 183, 190–92 (2004).
6. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 105, Dec.
10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS].
7. See Bahar, supra note 4, at 6 (“[C]ontrary to the assertions of many
commentators, authors, and practitioners, sufficient international law exists
to enable the military and diplomats to counter piracy . . . .”). Contra Douglas
R. Burgess, Op-Ed., Piracy Is Terrorism, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2008, at A33,
available at 2008 WLNR 23389243 (“Today the world’s navies are hamstrung
by conflicting laws and the absence of an international code.”).
8. See Jeffrey Gettleman, Rounding Up Suspects, The West Turns to
Kenya as Piracy Criminal Court, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2009, at A8, available at
2009 WLNR 7699213; David Morgan, U.S. Delivers Seven Somali Pirate Suspects to Kenya, REUTERS, Mar. 5, 2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/
article/idUSTRE52480N20090305.
9. See, e.g., Press Release, Allied Mar. Command Headquarters Northwood, NATO Warship Esbern Snare Disrupts Pirates in the Gulf of Aden (Nov.
15, 2010), available at http://www.manw.nato.int/pdf/Press%20Releases%
202010/Jun%20-%20Dec%202010/SNMG1/HDMS%20ESBERN%20SNARE%20
disrupts%20pirates%20in%20the%20Gulf%20Of%20Aden.pdf (“The suspected
pirates were taken onboard ESBERN SNARE for questioning and evidence
was collected . . . . [T]he suspected pirates were . . . issued a low-power outboard motor rendering the skiff useless for piracy.”).
10. UNCLOS, supra note 6, art. 105 (“The courts of the state which carried out the seizure may decide upon the penalties to be imposed . . . .”); 2
INT’L LAW COMM’N, YEARBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION art.
43 cmt. (1956), available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/publications/yearbooks/
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states based on universality over those of states with real ties
to the crime. This developing practice threatens the status of
UNCLOS as a codification of customary international law.11
States acting in contravention of their treaties hinder the
emergence of an effective solution to the dangerous and costly
global maritime piracy problem.
This Note examines the pressing need for a coherent solution to these jurisdictional complications. Part I considers modern maritime piracy, its history, and the relevant instruments
of international law. Part II evaluates the myriad of responses
to piracy in terms of international norms and agreements in
order to determine whether current responses comply with international law. Part III argues that criminal proceedings
should occur in the state with the strongest jurisdictional
claim—despite the UNCLOS proscription—and proposes a
framework to balance the convergent legal forces surrounding
piracy. This Note concludes that transfers of suspected pirates
to third-party states, although not preferred, are entirely legal
under international law, suggesting that UNCLOS will require
reinterpretation or amendment of its piracy provisions in order
to remain relevant.
I. THE EVER-PRESENT PIRACY THREAT AND ITS
LEGAL FOILS
Acts of piracy did not historically involve a unique type of
criminal act, but simply a unique location.12 States and international bodies throughout the ages defined piracy in many different ways. The U.S. Constitution gives Congress the power to
“define and punish” piracy on the high seas.13 Congress’s antipiracy statutes throughout history deferred to the law of na-

Ybkvolumes(e)/ILC_1956_v2_e.pdf (“This article gives any State the right to
seize pirate ships (and ships seized by pirates) and to have them adjudicated
upon by its courts. This right cannot be exercised at a place under the jurisdiction of another State.”).
11. See United States v. Alaska, 503 U.S. 569, 588 n.10 (1992) (explaining
that the baseline provisions of UNCLOS reflect customary international law);
Sarei v. Rio Tinto, 487 F.3d 1193, 1210, 1078 (9th Cir. 2007) (reiterating
UNCLOS’s status as a codification of custom, but refusing to hold that these
norms have become jus cogens); R. v. Rimbaut (1998), 202 N.B.R. 2d 87, para.
12 (Can. N.B. Q.B.) (holding UNCLOS article 111 as declaratory of international custom).
12. E.g., Talbot v. Jansen, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133, 160 (1795) (“What is called
robbery on the land, is piracy if committed at sea.”).
13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
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tions to define these crimes.14 Determining what constituted piracy under the law of nations often garnered inconsistent results. Courts frequently found that the definition consisted of
plundering or “depredating on the high seas.”15 These crimes
represented the high seas analogue to criminal thefts on land.16
In this vein, piracy under the law of nations recently came to
encompass, in addition to depredation, “any illegal acts of violence or detention” on the high seas or “outside the jurisdiction
of any State.”17
It appears that piracy might once again require revisions
to its definition. Crimes committed at sea today appear to clearly constitute piracy, but in fact bear some significant differences. As a result, the laws that developed in response to this problem, namely universal jurisdiction, now come into conflict with
new instruments of maritime law. Highlighting the severity of
the piracy problem will demonstrate the need for a serious examination of the legal tools available to address it.
A. THE PIRACY PROBLEM
The first recorded incidents of piracy occurred in ancient
times.18 Although the offense itself bore several definitions over
time,19 punishment of crimes at sea that were considered piracy
remained consistently swift and decisive throughout history.20
Responses to piracy today bear neither of these traits, partly
because modern pirates operate in very different ways. Piracy
14. 18 U.S.C. § 1651 (1948); see also United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5
Wheat.) 153, 154 (1820) (discussing Congress’s deferral to the law of nations in
defining and punishing acts of piracy).
15. The Ambrose Light, 25 F. 408, 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1885) (citing Dana’s
Wheaton International Law § 122); accord Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 153.
16. See Talbot, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 160; cf. The Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. (2
How.) 210, 232–33 (1844) (noting that seizure alone is enough to constitute
piracy even without an actual theft).
17. UNCLOS, supra note 6, art. 101. Contra United States v. Furlong, 18
U.S. (5 Wheat.) 184, 184 (1820) (distinguishing the crime of piracy from that of
murder).
18. WAYNE SANDHOLTZ & KENDALL STILES, INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND
CYCLES OF CHANGE 32–33 (2009); H.E. José Luis Jesus, Protection of Foreign
Ships Against Piracy and Terrorism at Sea: Legal Aspects, 18 INT’L J. MARINE
& COASTAL L. 363, 364 (2003).
19. Compare Talbot, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 160 (defining piracy as robbery on
the high seas), with The Ambrose Light, 25 F. at 412 (defining piracy more
broadly as “depradations on the high seas”).
20. See, e.g., The Mariana Flora, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 1, 40–41 (1825);
Kontorovich, supra note 5, at 190 (explaining the former practice of controlling
pirates through capture, trial, or summary execution on the high seas).
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today includes new tactics employed to carry out a crime predating recorded history. Speedboats and Kalashnikovs, rather
than frigates and cutlasses, recently became the pirate’s weapons of choice.21 While looting cargo or stealing ships outright
remain standard practice, Somali pirates today also kidnap sailors for ransom.22 The new face of this historic crime exacts
worldwide human and financial costs, and poses an existential
challenge to the piracy laws developed throughout the centuries.
As with ancient civilizations fighting for survival against
the pirate scourge,23 the proliferation of piracy today poses
drastic economic and security threats. The sudden increase in
attacks on ships sailing through vital shipping routes in the
Gulf of Aden, and before it the Malacca Strait in Asia, became
popular topics for the media in recent years.24 In Malacca, the
proximity of territorial seas belonging to functional governments permitted successful responses to greatly reduce the incidence of robberies and killings at sea.25 In contrast, pirates
roving the Gulf of Aden, and now expanding far into the Indian
Ocean,26 hail with few exceptions from the failed state of Soma-

21. Joshua Michael Goodwin, Note, Universal Jurisdiction and the Pirate:
Time for an Old Couple to Part, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L. L. 973, 982 (2006).
22. Jeffrey Gettleman, Pirates Tell Their Side: They Want Only Money,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2008, at A1, available at 2008 WLNR 18637664.
23. Pirates plagued the coasts of ancient Greece. SANDHOLTZ & STILES,
supra note 18, at 32; Jesus, supra note 18, at 364. The Romans battled pirates
and marauders from the sea almost constantly. Id. Even the great Julius Caesar reportedly fell captive to pirates. 2 PLUTARCH, THE LIVES OF THE NOBLE
GRECIANS AND ROMANS 200 (Arthur Hugh Clough ed., Dryden trans., 1992);
SUETONIUS, THE LIVES OF THE TWELVE CAESARS: AUGUSTUS 4 (1931). China
also endured a chronic infestation of pirates in its waters. Bahar, supra note 4,
at 11 n.31.
24. See, e.g., Derek S. Reveron, Think Again: Pirates, FOREIGN POL’Y, Jan.
12, 2009, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/01/11/think_again_pirates;
Somali Pirates Wreak Havoc with Maritime Traffic, ALLIED FOREIGN PRESS,
Sept. 14, 2008, http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5hZYx9sbzOMTKG3bDs8y_
ZWxXONSA.
25. See Jesus, supra note 18, at 366, 369 (describing the problem and responses in the Malacca Strait); cf. Tammy M. Sittnick, State Responsibility
and Maritime Terrorism in the Strait of Malacca: Persuading Indonesia and
Malaysia to Take Additional Steps to Secure the Strait, 14 PAC. RIM L. &
POL’Y. J. 743, 752–56 (2005).
26. Jonathan Saul, Somali Pirates Widening Attack Area: U.S. Admiral,
REUTERS, Mar. 25, 2010, available at http://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/
idAFJOE62O0LY20100325.
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lia.27 The formerly robust democracy is now unable to police its
waters or effectively cooperate with concerned neighbors or
other states.28 This power vacuum on land and sea permitted
poor fishermen, farmers, teenagers, and clan leaders to take to
the seas and throw international shipping into a dangerous and
expensive crisis.29
The International Maritime Organization (IMO) reported
sixty pirate attacks on ships off the coast of East Africa during
2007,30 between 134 and 153 attacks during 2008,31 and 222 in
2009.32 This trend took a promising turn in 2010, perhaps due
to naval intervention, but pirates are rational criminals who
will find new ways to ply their trade despite such efforts.33 The
number of pirate attacks off East Africa decreased, but incidents increased further out to sea, with substantially more attacks in both the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea.34 Worse
still, many attacks go unreported.35 Thus, the human cost of
27. Roger Middleton, Piracy in Somalia: Threatening Global Trade, Feeding Local Wars, CHATHAM HOUSE, 3 n.2 (Oct. 2008), http://www.chathamhouse
.org.uk/files/12203_1008piracysomalia.pdf.
28. Will Ross, Somali Navy Chief: World’s Worst Job?, BBC NEWS, June
16, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8096137.stm; see also S.C. Res. 1816, ¶
7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1816 (June 2, 2008), available at http://daccess-dds-ny.un
.org/doc/UNDOC/N08/361/77/PDF/N0836177.pdf; Press Release, Sec. Council,
Security Council Authorizes States to Use Land-Based Operations in Somalia
as Part of Fight Against Piracy Off Coast, Unanimously Adopting 1851, U.N.
Press Release SC/9541 (Dec. 16, 2008), available at http://www.un.org/News/
Press/docs/2008/sc2008/sc9541.htm.
29. See Bahar, supra note 4, at 67.
30. INT’L MARITIME ORG., REPORTS ON ACTS OF PIRACY AND ARMED
ROBBERY AGAINST SHIPS: ANNUAL REPORT – 2007, at 1 (2008), available at
http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D22585/115.pdf.
31. INT’L MARITIME ORG., REPORTS ON ACTS OF PIRACY AND ARMED
ROBBERY AGAINST SHIPS: ANNUAL REPORT – 2008, at 1 (2009), available at
http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D25550/133.pdf.
32. INT’L MARITIME ORG., REPORTS ON ACTS OF PIRACY AND ARMED
ROBBERY AGAINST SHIPS: ANNUAL REPORT – 2009, at 2 (2010), available at
http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D28158/152.pdf.
33. See Peter T. Leeson, Rationality, Pirates, and the Law: A Retrospective, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 1219, 1225 (2010).
34. INT’L MARITIME ORG., REPORTS ON ACTS OF PIRACY AND ARMED
ROBBERY AGAINST SHIPS: FIRST QUARTERLY REPORT – 2010, at 2 (2010),
available at http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D29096/
153.pdf (“The areas affected over the period under review were, East Africa
(35 incidents, down from 47 reported last quarter) . . . .”).
35. DANIEL SEKULICH, TERROR ON THE SEAS: TRUE TALES OF MODERNDAY PIRATES 142 (2009); Alexander S. Skaridov, Hostis Humani Generis, in
LEGAL CHALLENGES IN MARITIME SECURITY 479, 485 (Myron H. Nordquist et
al. eds., 2008).
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these attacks in terms of trauma, fear, and physical harm or
death is probably immeasurable. In terms of lost profits, not including ransoms paid, the International Maritime Bureau’s estimates reached between $13 and $15 billion between the Indian and Pacific Oceans in 2006 alone.36 Tragically, the
economies of nearby states such as Kenya, whose port at Mombasa is an essential waypoint and income generator, will bear
the brunt of this loss.37 The increased risk of sending ships and
crews into waters through which thirty percent of the world’s
marketed oil passes led to dramatic increases in insurance
premiums that threaten to cripple the international shipping
industry.38 Moreover, the potential inroads for terrorism in this
burgeoning criminal activity raise serious security concerns.39
Though some commentators advocated for a holistic assessment
of the situation and its potential solutions,40 journalists and citizens called for a decisive response to the piracy problem,41 and,
as a result, several governments sent in their navies.42
The historical struggle between states and pirates often
evolved as political attitudes towards piracy developed.43 Initial
36. Bahar, supra note 4, at 4.
37. Sayyid Azim, African Businesses Hit Hard; Tourists Scared Off by Pirates, SOMALILAND TIMES, Nov. 13, 2005, http://www.somalilandtimes.net/200/
27.shtml.
38. See Osvaldo Peçanha Caninas, Modern Maritime Piracy: History,
Present Situation and Challenges to International Law 21 (July 22, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.allacademic.com/one/isa-abri/
meeting09/index.php?click_key=1&PHPSESSID=a91b9ad6ff10db53a5c6c156420
e265b; Mary Harper, Life in Somalia’s Pirate Town, BBC NEWS, Sept. 18,
2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7623329.stm; Middleton, supra note 27,
at 3 (explaining the importance of the Gulf of Aden, through which “[s]ome
16,000 ships a year pass,” to international trade); cf. Burgess, supra note 7, at
A39 (“In a trial before the Old Bailey in 1696, Dr. Henry Newton, the Admiralty
advocate, declared, ‘Suffer pirates and the commerce of the world must cease.’”).
39. Bahar, supra note 4, at 5; Michael H. Passman, Protections Afforded to
Captured Pirates Under the Law of War and International War, 33 TUL. MAR.
L.J. 3, 3 n.10 (2008).
40. Kaplan, supra note 3, at WK9; Roger Middleton, Piracy Symptom of
Bigger Problem, BBC NEWS, Apr. 15, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/
8001183.stm; Johann Hari, You Are Being Lied to About Pirates, HUFFINGTON
POST (Jan. 4, 2009, 8:55 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/johann-hari/you
-are-being-lied-to-abo_b_155147.html.
41. Colloquim, Room for Debate: Capture Pirates, on Land and Sea, N.Y.
TIMES ROOM FOR DEBATE (Apr. 9, 2009, 7:44 PM), http://roomfordebate.blogs
.nytimes.com/2009/04/09/capture-pirates-on-land-and-sea/.
42. Frank Gardner, Taking on Somalia’s Pirates, BBC NEWS, Feb. 11, 2009,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7882618.stm; Japan to Deploy Ships Off Somalia, BBC NEWS, Jan. 28, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7855120.stm.
43. See FREDERICK C. LEINER, THE END OF BARBARY TERROR: AMERICA’S
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military responses to this new phenomenon were swift,44 and
became more sophisticated over time,45 but the twentieth century contributed legal problems that make these responses anything but decisive. While meeting these violent crimes with
force can likely reduce their frequency,46 this essential response
requires a robust legal counterpart in order to have a lasting
deterrent effect.
B. ADRIFT IN THE LEGAL DOLDRUMS OF OLD AND NEW LAWS
Despite the long-standing tradition of states extending
their judicial reach beyond the confines of their own territory,
those who capture pirates today must assess their legal positions carefully. The existence of true universal jurisdiction now
appears illusory from the perspectives of both history and modern practice. Other forms of jurisdiction require connections to
the alleged crime that are not always present. In addition,
many states now have treaty obligations under UNCLOS, the
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the
Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA), or both that complicate
decisions about what to do with suspected pirates. The interplay of jurisdictional regimes and laws of the sea requires careful consideration.
1. Jurisdiction over Piracy
States have a wide range of legal tools available to apply
their domestic laws to pirates—who, by definition, committed
their crimes outside any state’s sovereign territory47—including

1815 WAR AGAINST THE PIRATES OF NORTH AFRICA 49–51 (2006) (describing
the U.S. decision to wage war against Tripoli, rather than adjudicate captured
pirate vessels in American courts); Caninas, supra note 38, at 4 (describing the
end of the privateering practice).
44. Josh Meyer, Snipers Kill Pirates in Dramatic Rescue, CHI. TRIB., Apr.
13, 2009, at 1, available at 2009 WLNR 6874418; Graham Bowley, Pirate
‘Mother Ship’ or Thai Trawler?, N.Y. TIMES LEDE BLOG (Nov. 28, 2008,
1:05 PM), http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/11/25/pirate-mother-ship-or
-thai-trawler/?scp=2&sq=pirate&st=cse.
45. Will Ross, Drones Scour the Sea For Pirates, BBC NEWS, Nov. 10,
2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8352631.stm; Joseph Schuman, NATO
Sends in Stealth Sub to Combat African Pirates, AOL NEWS (June 29, 2010),
http://www.hiiran.com/news2/2010/Jun/nato_sends_in_stealth_sub_to_combat_
african_pirates.aspx?flv=1.
46. See Tullio Treves, Piracy, Law of the Sea, and Use of Force: Developments Off the Coast of Somalia, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 399, 412–14 (2009).
47. UNCLOS, supra note 6, art. 101(a)(i)–(ii).
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extraterritorial and even universal jurisdiction.48 The flag state
of a ship attacked or used by pirates can still assert territorial
jurisdiction, because any ship flying a sovereign’s flag remains
part of its territory, even if the surrounding seas are not.49
When states lack exclusive power to prosecute based on the location of the crime, they require a basis for exercising jurisdiction extraterritorially.50
States may use three essential bases of extraterritorial jurisdiction to establish a nexus between themselves and illegal
acts of piracy occurring completely outside their territory. First,
a state can exercise jurisdiction based on the nationality of the
suspected offender, if he or she is a citizen of that state.51
Second, exercising jurisdiction by passive nationality allows a
state to prosecute based on the nationality of the victim.52 Finally, the protective principle gives a state jurisdiction over
crimes that endanger its security or other national interests.53
In the United States, courts use a two-part test to determine the appropriateness of any exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction.54 They consider whether Congress intended to permit extraterritorial application of a given statute, and whether
such application would be reasonable under international
law.55 Congressional intent often reveals itself in the type of
crime Congress sought to prevent or in the text of the statute.56
Courts find their exercises of extraterritorial jurisdiction valid
under the second element of this inquiry when they conform to

48. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 404 (1987).
49. UNCLOS, supra note 6, art. 92.1; Convention on the High Seas art.
6.1, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 450 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter High Seas];
see also United States v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137, 155–56 (1933) (“[A] merchant
vessel which, for purposes of the jurisdiction of the courts of the sovereignty
whose flag it flies to punish crimes committed upon it, is deemed to be a part
of the territory of that sovereignty, and not to lose that character when in navigable waters within the territorial limits of another sovereignty.” (citing
United States v. Rodgers, 150 U.S. 264 (1893))); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§ 402 cmt. h, 502 (1987).
50. SANDHOLTZ & STILES, supra note 18, at 45.
51. MARIA GAVOUNELI, FUNCTIONAL JURISDICTION IN THE LAW OF THE
SEA 6 (2007); SANDHOLTZ & STILES, supra note 18, at 44 –45.
52. GAVOUNELI, supra note 51, at 7.
53. Id. at 6.
54. Unites States v. Neil, 312 F.3d 419, 421 (9th Cir. 2002).
55. United States v. Felix-Gutierrez, 940 F.2d 1200, 1204 (9th Cir. 1991)
(citing United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 98 (1922)).
56. Bowman, 260 U.S. at 97–98.
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international principles of extraterritorial jurisdiction.57 While
this part of the test may appear redundant, courts probably
find it necessary to ensure that domestic practices of applying
jurisdiction extraterritorially follow the generally accepted international norms.
Because these jurisdictional claims may exist when a
state’s vessel, victim, offender, or security interests are affected
within another sovereign’s territorial waters, the second part of
this judicial test might also require an assessment of potential
concurrent jurisdictional claims. United States courts maintain
that their exercise of jurisdiction as the flag state of American
vessels sailing in foreign waters exists only subject to the territorial sovereign’s interest in securing its ports.58 Accordingly, if
the territorial sovereign makes a concurrent claim of jurisdiction, at least over serious crimes committed within its waters,
such a claim takes precedent over any flag-state or extraterritorial jurisdiction claims by other sovereigns.59
The difficulties associated with establishing a viable claim
to jurisdiction over acts of piracy may have led to the advent of
universal jurisdiction.60 This legal doctrine provided jurisdiction for any state over acts of piracy “with which they have no
direct connection.”61 States ostensibly based universal jurisdiction on the premise that piracy is an act of such heinousness
that pirates are hostis humanis generis, or enemies of all mankind.62 Because pirates committed their crimes beyond the law
of nations, they placed themselves “beyond the protection of
any State.”63 As enemies of all mankind, pirates attracted the
ire of all nations wherever they emerged.64 It appears that the
substantial political will and military ability of the international community to combat piracy at the time inspired this robust

57. See, e.g., Felix-Gutierrez, 940 F.2d at 1205–06; Chua Han Mow v.
United States, 730 F.2d 1308, 1311–12 (9th Cir. 1984).
58. See United States v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137, 157 (1933); cf. UNCLOS,
supra note 6, art. 27.
59. Flores, 289 U.S. at 157–58 (citing Mali v. Keeper of the Common Jail,
120 U.S. 1, 14 –19 (1887)).
60. See Bahar, supra note 4, at 15.
61. Id. at 13.
62. Kontorovich, supra note 5, at 233.
63. In re Piracy Jure Gentium, [1934] A.C. 586 at 589 (Eng.); see also
SANDHOLTZ & STILES, supra note 18, at 46.
64. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *71.
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legal instrument.65 As a result, any state trying pirates had
ample authority to do so under international law.
However, legitimate doubts about the genuine origins of
this ignominious designation abound.66 Scholars claim that the
justifications for creating universal jurisdiction to combat piracy do not withstand academic scrutiny.67 Although the heinousness of the crime purportedly supports the right of all states
to punish it, piracy was not historically—nor is it now—
considered particularly heinous in comparison to torture or
murder.68 Even if these reasons were valid at one time, they
might not apply as well today. For example, pirates historically
became stateless men sailing in stateless ships by the nature of
their crimes, but modern laws such as UNCLOS abrogate this
automatic expatriation.69
Regardless of whether members of the international community were serious about their protestations against piracy,
they rarely ever used universal jurisdiction to try suspected pirates.70 Yet universal jurisdiction for piracy provided the fundamental justification for modern extensions of universal jurisdiction to internationally deplored crimes such as genocide,
torture, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.71 These jurisdictional forms comprise the set available to both states and
international instruments in confronting maritime piracy.
2. Laws of the Sea
The Geneva Convention on High Seas (Geneva LOS) and
the later UNCLOS govern most international responses to pi65. SANDHOLTZ & STILES, supra note 18, at 37.
66. See generally Kontorovich, supra note 5, at 233 (arguing that heinousness could not serve as the foundation of universal jurisdiction for piracy because the crime of piracy was not actually considered particularly heinous);
Goodwin, supra note 21, 987–1001 (echoing Kontorovich’s arguments).
67. See Kontorovich, supra note 5, at 233.
68. Id. at 186; Goodwin, supra note 21, at 995–96.
69. Goodwin, supra note 21, at 988–89.
70. E.g., Alfred P. Rubin, Revising the Law of “Piracy”, 21 CAL. W. INT’L
L.J. 129, 133 (1991); cf. 18 U.S.C. § 1651 (1946) (providing jurisdiction over
piracy suspects “brought into or found in the United States,” but not those found
anywhere in the world); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
§ 404 (1987) (“Although international law is law of the United States[,] . . . a
person cannot be tried in the federal courts for an international crime unless
Congress adopts a statute to define and punish the offense.”); 44B AM. JUR. 2D
International Law § 70 (2007) (listing no criminal cases against suspected pirates applying universal jurisdiction); Brian L. Porto, Annotation, Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction of Federal Courts, 1 A.L.R. FED. 415, 415 (2005).
71. Kontorovich, supra note 5, at 186.
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racy today.72 The Geneva LOS and UNCLOS provisions on piracy are nearly identical, using the same or very similar language to obligate all parties to fight piracy cooperatively.73
They each define piracy as illegal acts of violence, detention, or
depredation on the high seas or outside any state’s jurisdiction.74 Additionally, this definition “corresponds to the common
expression that a pirate is hostis humanis generis” and limits
its scope to acts having “private ends,” excluding politically motivated acts.75
The United States did not sign UNCLOS,76 but remains a
party to Geneva LOS.77 UNCLOS superseded the Geneva LOS
conventions as to parties of both treaties.78 Those parties include the major players in the fight against maritime piracy.
Somalia, Kenya, Seychelles, Yemen, Denmark, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, China, India, and Japan are all parties to UNCLOS.79 Indeed, UNCLOS currently has 160 state
parties,80 a sufficiently large proportion of all states for it to
constitute a codification of customary international law.81 Additionally, submission for ratification gives UNCLOS force as between the United States and other state parties, and the Unit-

72. UNCLOS, supra note 6, art. 1; High Seas, supra note 49, art. 1.
73. Compare UNCLOS, supra note 6, art. 100(“All States shall cooperate
to the fullest possible extent in the repression of piracy on the high seas or in
any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State.”), with High Seas, supra
note 49, art. 14 (“All States shall cooperate to the fullest possible extent in the
repression of piracy on the high seas or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State.”).
74. UNCLOS, supra note 6, art. 101; High Seas, supra note 49, art. 15.
75. SATYA N. NANDAN & SHABTAI ROSENNE, 3 UNITED STATES
CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 1982: A COMMENTARY art. 101.8a (Myron H. Nordquist ed., 1995).
76. 2 MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE SECRETARYGENERAL ch. XXI, § 6 (2009), available at http://treaties.un.org/Pages/DB.aspx?
path=DB/MTDSGStatus/pageIntro_en.xml (indicating that the United States
has not signed UNCLOS).
77. Id. § 2 (indicating that the United States ratified Geneva LOS on
April 12, 1961).
78. UNCLOS, supra note 6, art. 311.4.
79. MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL,
supra note 76, ch. XXI, §§ 1–6.
80. Id.
81. Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 456 F.3d 1069, 1082 (9th Cir. 2006) (explaining that ratification by “at least 149” states at the time was “sufficient for
[UNCLOS] to codify customary international law,” but noting that it was not
certain that the norms represented in UNCLOS were nonderogable jus cogens). Contra Rubin, supra note 70, at 136–37.
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ed States has stated its intention to respect the rules of
UNCLOS on “navigation and other matters.”82
UNCLOS article 105 gives every state the right to capture
suspected pirates and permits the courts of the capturing state
to determine their penalty.83 As with the other UNCLOS provisions, article 105 closely mirrors its Geneva LOS counterpart,
article 19.84 The language permitting any state to capture and
try pirates in its courts reflects universal jurisdiction principles.85 Yet it appears to impose some limits. This is the essential issue surrounding maritime piracy today. Each article says
“[t]he courts of the State which carried out the seizure may decide upon the penalties to be imposed.”86 The permissive “may”
applies expressio unius to the seizing state’s courts only. Furthermore, the Commission’s commentary to draft article 43,
which corresponds to Geneva LOS article 19, cryptically explained that “[t]his article gives any State the right to seize pirate ships (and ships seized by pirates) and to have them adjudicated upon by its courts,”87 and that “[t]his right cannot be
exercised at a place under the jurisdiction of another State.”88
Opinions differ on whether this comment limits the exercise of universal jurisdiction to the capturing state, reiterates
the prohibition against seizing vessels in another state’s territorial waters,89 or merely implies that courts in the capturing
state will apply their own domestic law, including that on conflict of laws.90 The official meaning of this language is crucial
since it reads as a proscription of the transfers so widely practiced today. Whether these practices put states in contraven82. United States v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 11 F. Supp. 2d 1358,
1372 (S.D. Fla. 1998). Contra United States v. Best, 304 F.3d 308, 320 (3d Cir.
2002) (holding that failure to ratify UNCLOS denies it the force of law within
the United States).
83. UNCLOS, supra note 6, art. 105.
84. Compare UNCLOS, supra note 6, art. 105 (stating the right of a state
to seize a pirate ship or a ship taken by pirates), with High Seas, supra note
49, art. 19 (same).
85. NANDAN & ROSENNE, supra note 75, art. 105.10(a).
86. UNCLOS, supra note 6, art. 105; High Seas, supra note 49, art. 19.
87. INT’L L. COMM’N, supra note 10, art. 43.
88. Id.
89. J. Ashley Roach, Countering Piracy Off Somalia: International Law
and International Institutions, 104 AM. J. INT’L L. 397, 404 (2010).
90. Compare NANDAN & ROSENNE, supra note 75, art. 105.10(c) (detailing
the limits of universal jurisdiction in piracy prosecution), with Eugene Kontorovich, “A Guantanamo on the Sea”: The Difficulty of Prosecuting Pirates and
Terrorists, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 243, 248, 259 (2010) (discussing the possibility of
applying one’s own domestic law in pirate prosecution).

2298

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[95:2285

tion of customary international law and their own treaty commitments, or weaken UNCLOS as a codification of custom, thus
remains uncertain.
UNCLOS parties would have several options if they desired to clarify this point. The International Tribunal for the
Law of the Sea (ITLOS) has competence to issue an advisory
opinion on the provision’s meaning.91 However, ITLOS lacks
competence to try suspected pirates themselves.92 Despite calls
to permit such trials through amendment to the statute of
ITLOS or additional UNCLOS protocols,93 converting a judicial
body initially designed to settle interpretive disputes among
states relating to UNCLOS into a criminal tribunal remains
unprecedented and impractical.94 UNCLOS article 105 would
nonetheless preclude this possibility at ITLOS and other international courts, such as the International Criminal Court,
which also lack the mandate to hear piracy cases.95 Parties
could alternatively amend UNCLOS to suit their needs through
formal procedure by convening a consensus-seeking conference,
or through simplified procedure, followed by adoption of an
amendment and signature, ratification, or accession to it.96
SUA overlaps with UNCLOS, and may provide a stopgap
in some areas.97 Created in response to the horrific hijacking of
the Achille Lauro in 1985,98 SUA applies primarily to terror91. Proceedings and Cases – Competence, INT’L TRIBUNAL L. SEA, http://
www.itlos.org/procedings/competence/decisions_start_en.shtml (last visited Apr.
29, 2011) (“The Tribunal has jurisdiction over any dispute . . . concerning the
interpretation or application of the Convention.”).
92. Press Release, Clarification, ITLOS/Press 135 (Apr. 24, 2009) (“[The
ITLOS] is not a criminal court and has no competence to try pirates.”). Contra
Kenya Prosecutors Charge Suspected Somali Pirates, RADIO NETH.
WORLDWIDE (May 24, 2009), http://www.rnw.nl/int-justice/article/kenya
-prosecutors-charge-suspected-somali-pirates (click “general information”)
(“The president of the UN-sponsored International Tribunal for the Law of the
Sea in Germany, Luis Jesus, said that body is ready to take piracy cases.”).
93. E.g., Joseph M. Isanga, Countering Persistent Contemporary Sea Piracy:
Expanding Jurisdictional Regimes, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 1267, 1273, 1314 (2010).
94. General Information – Overview, INT’L TRIBUNAL L. SEA, http://www
.itlos.org/start2_en.html (last visited Apr. 29, 2011).
95. Cf. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 5, July 17,
1998, 37 I.L.M. 999, 1003–04 (listing the court’s competence over only crimes
of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and aggression).
96. UNCLOS, supra note 6, arts. 306–07, 312–13, 315–16.
97. See Eugene Kontorovich, International Legal Responses to Piracy Off the
Coast of Somalia, ASIL INSIGHTS (Feb. 6, 2009), http://www.asil.org/insights
090206.cfm (explaining the jurisdictional concerns with prosecuting piracy).
98. PRESIDENT OF THE U.S., PROTOCOLS OF 2005 TO THE CONVENTION
CONCERNING SAFETY OF MARITIME NAVIGATION AND TO THE PROTOCOL
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ism.99 Like UNCLOS, it has a large number of state parties, including the United States,100 though Somalia did not join.101
SUA does not cover theft, the penultimate requirement of a
piracy definition.102 Yet offenses under SUA include conduct
such as hijacking, acts of violence, and terrorism.103 SUA requires that state parties attempt to establish jurisdiction
through extraterritoriality over any person on a ship that will
travel, is travelling, or has travelled on the high seas and who
attempts, abets, or actually seizes a ship by force or intimidation.104 Most importantly, SUA applies in territorial waters.105
Its so-called extradite-or-punish provisions permit the transfer
of suspected offenders to other state parties, who establish the
strongest connection to an incident through extraterritorial jurisdiction or jurisdiction according to their domestic laws.106
The magnitude of the piracy problem in one of the world’s
most significant shipping lanes necessarily calls for robust international action to utilize the varied and powerful legal tools
designed to combat piracy. The availability of territorial, extraterritorial, and universal jurisdiction along with domestic antipiracy laws and international instruments such as UNCLOS
and SUA give the impression of a comprehensive and decisive
legal regime. Pirates do not appear to stand a chance. On the
contrary, they continue to hunt the Gulf of Aden and Indian
Ocean while the world powers trip over their treaties.107 ModCONCERNING SAFETY OF FIXED PLATFORMS ON THE CONTINENTAL SHELF, at
VI (2007).
99. Convention and Protocol from the International Conference on the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation
pmbl., Mar. 10, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 668 [hereinafter Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts].
100. 18 U.S.C § 2280 (1996); INT’L MARITIME ORG., STATUS OF
CONVENTIONS (2011), available at http://www.imo.org/Conventions/mainframe
.asp?topic_id=248.
101. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts, supra note 99.
102. See id. art. 3.
103. Id.
104. Id. arts. 1, 4, 6.
105. Id. art. 4.
106. Id. arts. 6, 8, 10; Malvina Halberstam, Terrorism on the High Seas: The
Achille Lauro Piracy and the IMO Convention on Maritime Safety, 82 AM. J.
INT’L L. 269, 282 (1988); see also S.C. Res. 1851, pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1851
(Dec. 16, 2008) (discussing piracy transfers and jurisdictional issues).
107. See, e.g., Kenya to Help Navy Chase Pirates, COPENHAGEN POST, Aug.
18, 2009, http://www.cphpost.dk/news/international/89-international/46605
-kenya-to-help-navy-chase-pirates.html (“[T]he Danish navy release[d] 10 captured pirates because no country would accept them for trial.”).
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ern responses to piracy—both at the point of capture and at trial—must use the available legal tools such as UNCLOS to their
advantage rather than straining against them, or states risk
undermining them and further complicating an already complex area of law.
II. MODERN RESPONSES
The responses of most states to piracy in the Straits of
Aden consist of deploying a significant military presence to the
area to deter further attacks.108 When navy ships apprehend
suspected pirates they face the puzzling question of what to do
with them.109 As citizens of a failed state, sending Somali pirates home could be tantamount to granting amnesty or, conversely, subjecting them to severe reprisals.110 Bringing them
to the territory of the capturing state presents messy logistics
and high costs.111 As a result, the United States and European
Union prefer to arrange for trial and detention of suspects in
Kenya or the Seychelles and express eagerness to explore similar options with other neighboring states.112 As of April 2009

108. See Gardner, supra note 42 (discussing the EU’s efforts to stop pirates
with the military); Japan to Deploy Ships off Somalia, supra note 42 (discussing Japan’s efforts to stop pirates with the military); Paul Reynolds, Rules
Frustrate Anti-Piracy Efforts, BBC NEWS, Dec. 9, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/africa/7735144.stm (“There is already a small Flotilla of warships in the
region from the US, UK, Canada, France, Turkey, Germany, Russia, and India, among others.”).
109. Reynolds, supra note 108 (“[T]he issue of who will put pirates in trial
is a legal minefield and yet to be resolved.”).
110. Oliver Hawkins, What to Do with a Captured Pirate, BBC NEWS, Mar.
10, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7932205.stm; Reynolds, supra note 108.
111. See International Piracy on the High Seas: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation of the H. Comm. on
Transp. and Infrastructure, 111th Cong. 6 (2009) (statement of William Baumgartner, Rear Admiral, U.S. Coast Guard) [hereinafter International Piracy on
the High Seas] (discussing the complications of piracy prosecution).
112. See Exchange of Letters Between the European Union and the Government of Kenya on the Conditions and Modalities for the Transfer of Persons
Suspected of Having Committed Acts of Piracy and Detained by the European
Union-Led Naval Force (EUNAVFOR), and Seized Property in the Possession
of EUNAVFOR, from EUNAVFOR to Kenya and for Their Treatment After
Such Transfer, Mar. 6, 2009, 48 I.L.M. 751, 751 [hereinafter Exchange of Letters] (explicating how to transfer piracy suspects between countries); Matthew
Saltmarsh, Pirates Widen Range, Straining Naval Patrols, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20,
2009, available at 2009 WLNR 23426387 (“Agreements signed by the European
Union, Kenya and the Seychelles allow for processing of captured pirates in
those countries. Europe has also discussed extending this to Tanzania.”).
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the United States had sent fifty-two suspects to Kenya.113 Yet
Kenya’s recent refusal to accept additional transferees highlights the need for states to address this problem comprehensively.114 Moreover, these transfers overlook the capturing
states’ potential obligations under UNCLOS, or Geneva LOS, to
provide trial within their own jurisdictions.
A. CHASING AND CAPTURING SUSPECTED PIRATES
As in the golden age of piracy, powerful states today appear to recognize the efficiency of military deterrence. The multinational Combined Task Force 151, the Standing North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Maritime Group 2, the
European Naval Force Somalia (EUNAVFOR), and naval ships
from several other states all conduct counter-piracy missions in
the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean.115 In contrast to addressing the root causes of upsurges in pirate activity, navies
can deploy quickly and provide some deterrence in the area
that arguably produces immediate results. Indeed, they have
captured and scared off dozens of pirates since arriving in the
region in 2009.116 Yet despite the incredible amount of military
resources dedicated to fighting this problem, it appears that
states have not yet applied the commensurate legal resources
to help the militaries perform their tasks and deter acts of piracy. From the pursuit and capture of pirates at sea to their prosecution in courts, current practices do not reveal a systematic
application of the relevant international laws.
Several factors make naval patrols the only true legal and
practical option.117 Only warships can seize pirates under
UNCLOS,118 and the IMO strongly cautions against arming
113. Caninas, supra note 38, at 20.
114. Kenya Ends Somali Pirate Trials, BBC NEWS, Apr. 1, 2010, http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8599347.stm.
115. Press Release, EU NAVFOR, Counter Piracy Commanders Meet in
Gulf of Aden (Oct. 26, 2009), available at http://www.eunavfor.eu/2009/10/
counter-piracy-commanders-meet-in-gulf-of-aden/.
116. E.g., Press Release, Allied Mar. Command Headquarters Northwood,
NATO Warship Disrupts Pirates in Gulf of Aden (Jan. 10, 2011), available at
http://www.manw.nato.int/pdf/Press%20Releases%202011/Press%20releases%
20Jan-June%202011/SNMG2/100111%20SNMG2%202011%20001.pdf.
117. German Navy Foils Pirate Attack in Gulf of Aden, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26,
2008, at A11, available at 2008 WLNR 24747926 (“[W]arships are now patrolling the vast Gulf of Aden . . . .”); Fisher, supra note 2 (explaining that the
British frigate the HMS Northumberland and other ships in the EU taskforce
“Atalanta” are “trying to cover an area of more than a million square miles”).
118. UNCLOS, supra note 6, art. 107; High Seas, supra note 49, art. 21.
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merchant ship crews or carrying private security forces onboard because of the possibility for escalation of violence during
pirate attacks.119 Moreover, Somalia lacks the power to control
its own maritime territory, and so international antipiracy efforts necessarily do the job for it. The UNCLOS provisions that
protect coastal states’ sovereignty would hamper antipiracy efforts. Since UNCLOS permits the establishment of a state’s
territorial sea at the waters within twelve nautical miles from
the coastal low-water line,120 and Somalia is a signatory of the
treaty,121 pirates operating in a vast area around Somalia’s
long coastline could theoretically harass and hijack ships with
a manner of double impunity. States have thus gone to great
lengths to address that obstacle. Yet safeguarding their ability
to exercise jurisdiction in foreign territorial waters for enforcement purposes did not provide the broad and flexible adjudicative jurisdiction states today require.
The Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and
other semi-autonomous regions within Somalia are actively engaging with antipiracy efforts.122 Somalia went further than
waiving its expulsion right under UNCLOS.123 It actively requested international assistance to combat unlawful acts in its
waters and piracy,124 perhaps because it could not do so itself,
but also because neither UNCLOS nor SUA would otherwise
permit foreign navies to intervene in its waters.125 The Security
119. INT’L MARITIME ORG., PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY AGAINST SHIPS:
RECOMMENDATIONS TO GOVERNMENTS FOR PREVENTING AND SUPPRESSING
PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY AGAINST SHIPS 3 (2009), available at http://
www.imo.org/ourwork/security/docs/piracy%20and%20armed%20robbery/MSC.1
-Circ.1333.pdf (“For legal and safety reasons, flag states should strongly discourage the carrying and use of firearms by seafarers for personal protection
or for the protection of a ship.”).
120. UNCLOS, supra note 6, arts. 3–4.
121. Status of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea, UNITED NATIONS, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?&src=
TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXI~6&chapter=21&Temp=mtdsg3&lang=en (indicating
that Somalia signed and ratified the Convention).
122. See, e.g., Press Release, Headquarters Allied Mar. Command Northwood, Minister of Puntland State of Somalia Visits NATO Flagship Puntland
(Aug. 2, 2010), available at http://www.manw.nato.int/pdf/Press%20Releases%
202010/Jun%20-%20Dec%202010/SNMG2/SNMG2%202010%2031.pdf (detailing
attempts by NATO and Somali leaders to stop piracy).
123. UNCLOS, supra note 6, arts. 19, 30.
124. S.C. Res. 1851, supra note 106; S.C. Res. 1816, supra note 28.
125. E.g., Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts, supra note 99,
art. 7 (“[A]ny State Party in the territory of which the offender . . . is present
shall . . . take him into custody.” (emphasis added)).
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Council subsequently passed a number of resolutions on the
matter, which have authorized a robust use of military force.126
Notably, Resolution 1816 provides authorization for foreign
states cooperating with the TFG to enter its territorial waters
for the purpose of repressing piracy, provided the TFG notifies
the Secretary General in advance of the agreement.127 Resolution 1950 provides the most recent extension of that permission
from the date of its adoption.128 Further, Resolution 1851 arguably extends that permission to land-based operations as well,
which the French military has undertaken.129
Most states rightly justify such activities in the territorial
waters under their SUA ratification,130 since UNCLOS covers
only illegal acts on the high seas. Several of the Security Council resolutions cite the SUA as an important tool in fighting piracy.131 The United States also relies on its SUA implementation when trying suspected pirates and hijackers in its own
courts.132 On the high seas, however, all states must adhere to
UNCLOS. Yet they often fail to cite UNCLOS or universal jurisdiction in justification of their transfers to Kenya,133 and
sometimes do nothing amid confusion about which laws apply
in this legal morass.134 A systematic approach to the piracy

126. S.C. Res. 1851, supra note 106; S.C. Res. 1846, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1846
(Dec. 2, 2008); S.C. Res. 1844, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1844 (Nov. 20, 2008); S.C. Res.
1838, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1838 (Oct. 7, 2008); S.C. Res. 1816, supra note 28.
127. S.C. Res. 1816, supra note 28, ¶ 7.
128. S.C. Res. 1950, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1950 (June 26, 2010).
129. S.C. Res. 1851, supra note 106; Crispian Balmer, French Commandos
Swoop After Pirates Free Hostages, REUTERS, Apr. 11, 2008, available at http://
www.reuters.com/article/2008/04/11/us-france-somalia-pirates-idUSL118855872
0080411; Press Release, supra note 28 (publishing the statements of representatives from the United Kingdom, Belgium, the United States, South Africa, Germany, and India).
130. International Piracy on the High Seas, supra note 111, at 6.
131. S.C. Res. 1851, supra note 106.
132. See, e.g., Indictment at 1, United States v. Muse, No. 1:09-cr-00512LAP (S.D.N.Y. May 19, 2009) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2280 (1996)) (using SUA in a
piracy trial). However, the piracy charge against Muse no longer stands. Ray
Rivera, Somali Man Pleads Guilty in 2009 Hijacking of Ship, N.Y. TIMES, May
19, 2010, at A21, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/19/nyregion/
19pirate.html (explaining that the prosecutor dropped the piracy charge in exchange for a guilty plea).
133. Exchange of Letters, supra note 112, at 751–59 (citing UNCLOS articles in an agreement for transfers, which UNCLOS arguably does not permit, and making no mention of SUA or universal jurisdiction).
134. See Hawkins, supra note 110 (“According to Rear Admiral Philip
Jones, who heads the European Union’s piracy task force Operation Atalanta,
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problem would recognize the importance of enforcing international law in both territorial waters and high seas, and thus
provide for the proper use of SUA, UNCLOS, or domestic laws
according to the location of an incident.
The news reports do not precisely state the interplay of
these laws as the source of uncertainty, and also fail to mention
a location where any given suspects were apprehended.135 If the
captures took place in Somali waters, then the confusion might
surround the extent of the legal mandate afforded by the United Nations (U.N.) resolutions, or whether SUA and UNCLOS
apply in territorial waters. On the high seas, UNCLOS stops
short of prescribing universal jurisdiction or any SUA-type flexible mandate for jurisdictional options.136 Thus, even with the
territorial sea complication settled by the Security Council,
prosecuting suspected pirates captured on the high seas remains a pressing legal problem.
B. LEGAL RECOURSE AGAINST PIRATES AFTER CAPTURE
Under UNCLOS and Geneva LOS, state parties arguably
violate their obligations by failing to try suspected pirates
themselves.137 Yet current practice indicates preferences for
transferring them elsewhere.138 The parties to these conventions ignore the fact that they could also be violating the international law principle of pacta sunt servanda.139 Because Somalia is a party to UNCLOS, these states could be exposing
themselves to liability to Somali claims before ITLOS,140 at

when a navy intervenes to stop a pirate attack, they often do not know whether the pirates they catch can be prosecuted.”).
135. E.g., id.
136. UNCLOS, supra note 6, art. 100.
137. See id. art. 100; High Seas, supra note 49, art. 6.1.
138. James Kraska & Brian Wilson, The Pirates of the Gulf of Aden: The
Coalition Is the Strategy, 45 STAN. J. INT’L L. 243, 262 (2009) (“The mandate
issued by the European Union . . . grants warships . . . the authority . . . to arrest, detain, and transfer persons who have committed, or are suspected of
having committed, acts of piracy . . . .” (emphasis added) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
139. This is the rule that agreements and stipulations, especially those contained in treaties, must be observed. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
140. ITLOS has competence to hear disputes relating to the application or
interpretation of UNCLOS. UNCLOS, supra note 6, art. 288. States have
access to these dispute settlement procedures. Statute of the International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea art. 291, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397,
Annex VI, art. 20.
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least for transfers conducted before the TFG requested U.N. assistance, which might have waived any claim it had.
Another problem with this practice involves its significant
ramifications for the status of UNCLOS as a codification of customary international law. Currently, states violate the supposed prohibition of transfers with impunity. Objections to deviation from customary norms represent an essential aspect of
the creation and maintenance of custom.141 But allowing a deviation from a supposed norm to go unchallenged raises questions about whether that norm truly represents “a general and
consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of
legal obligation.”142 If transfers become the new customary
norm in this way, the law of the sea provisions will not become
invalidated. In fact, treaty provisions prevail over customs that
do not rise to the level of nonderogable jus cogens,143 which
UNCLOS has not.144 Appeals to customary international law
will thus fail to exempt states from the transfer prohibition.
Still, unless UNCLOS and Geneva LOS parties change this
practice or amend the convention to reflect it, transfers made
against the article 105 prohibition threaten to render UNCLOS
status as the quintessential document in this area questionable
precisely when its strength is most needed. If logistical and
other hindrances make trials in the capturing state difficult,
then the option to collaborate with nearby states should remain
open, and UNCLOS must adapt to that reality.
1. Trying Suspected Pirates at Home
The UNCLOS status as a codification of customary international law145 certainly appears to face a challenge as a result
of recent state practices. Even outside the context of transfers
to third parties, the U.N. resolutions and relevant cases in the
141. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW pt. I, ch. 1, introductory note (“In principle, law that has been generally accepted cannot be
later modified unilaterally by any state . . . , but particular states and groups
of states can contribute to the process of developing (and modifying) law by
their actions as well as by organized attempts to achieve formal change.”).
142. Id. § 102.
143. JESWALD SALACUSE, THE LAW OF INVESTMENT TREATIES 44 (2010).
144. Sarei v. Rio Tinto, 456 F.3d 1069, 1086 (9th Cir. 2006).
145. See United States v. Alaska, 503 U.S. 569, 588 n.10 (1992) (explaining
that the baseline provisions of UNCLOS reflect customary international law);
Rio Tinto, 456 F.3d at 1086 (reiterating UNCLOS’s status as a codification of
custom, but refusing to hold that these norms have become jus cogens); R. v.
Rimbaut (1998), 202 N.B.R. 2d 87, para. 12 (Can. N.B. Q.B.) (holding
UNCLOS art. 111 as declaratory of international custom).
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United States do not cite either law of the sea convention, but
rely on SUA instead. The two most prominent cases even concerned events that occurred on the high seas, where Geneva
LOS would also apply.146 When the United States does not ratify UNCLOS, a treaty purporting to codify customary law, and
then chooses not to cite its predecessor in applicable court decisions, this codification becomes more questionable.
The trend of favoring SUA appears to continue with the
indictment of the surviving accused Maersk Alabama hijacker,
Abduwali Abdukhadir Muse. Federal prosecutors in the Southern District of New York charged him with several counts of violating the Violence Against Maritime Navigation Act, the statute implementing SUA.147 Since this hijacking occurred on the
high seas, the apparent preference to apply SUA in domestic
trials—rather than validate the UNCLOS requirement to capture and to prosecute in domestic courts—might also cast doubt
upon the customary codification that UNCLOS purports to
represent. It might establish a different general practice.
Journalists, officials, and scholarly commentators alike invoke the murky and unclear international laws surrounding
this issue as barriers to domestic trials.148 These excuses, if actually made by states, misstate the issue. Most capturing states
have legislation criminalizing acts of piracy and affording jurisdiction over suspected pirates,149 and some have used
them.150 However, others exhibited reluctance to exercise jurisdiction over pirates because of their unwillingness to bear the
costs of investigation, trial, and imprisonment.151 Transfers of
suspected pirates to Kenya, for example, do currently exceed
the permissions of UNCLOS article 105.152 So the concerned
states should exhibit a consistent willingness to try suspected
pirates themselves whenever possible, but must also have the

146. See United States v. Shi, 525 F.3d 709, 720–21 (9th Cir. 2008); Indictment, supra note 132, at 1.
147. Indictment, supra note 132, at 2 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2280 (1996)).
148. Kraska & Wilson, supra note 138, at 268–69; Jeffrey Gettleman, Pirates in Skiffs Still Outmaneuvering Warships Off Somalia, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
16, 2008, at A6, available at 2008 WL 24053562.
149. E.g., MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE SECRETARYGENERAL, supra note 76.
150. E.g., Indictment, supra note 132.
151. Kontorovich, supra note 97.
152. See High Seas, supra note 49, art. 19; INT’L L. COMM’N, supra note 10,
art. 43 cmt.
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prerogative to pass on the suspects when they deem it necessary.
2. Transferring Suspected Pirates Elsewhere
The transfer of suspected pirates by the capturing state
marks the focal point of the legal problem in modern piracy
law. On one hand, as the raison d’être of universal jurisdiction,153 piracy should be the archetypical crime for which any
state can exercise jurisdiction. Conversely, numerous legal, political, and other forces converge on this issue to scare many
states into inaction precisely when they must act with robust
and forthright authority. Neither inaction nor determined action misguided by doubt and uncertainty will effectively bring
an end to the modern piracy problem. Currently, states cite a
“lack of political will”154 to comprehensively address the problem while they bowl through the clouds of perceived uncertainty; sending suspects back to Somali shores or transferring them
to Kenya, without cogently assessing the legal landscape.155
Despite the prohibitive language in the commentary of the International Law Commission,156 no legal proscription on transferring suspected pirates withstands scrutiny. States must recognize and acknowledge this fact.
The supposed prohibition on transfers might in fact be a
paper tiger, and a toothless one at that. Geneva LOS and
UNCLOS party members have not denounced the practice. Neither has the ITLOS issued an advisory opinion on the matter.
Accused pirates have not yet asserted defenses that they were
wrongly brought within the prosecuting state’s jurisdiction.
Without the actual invalidation of a transfer, or at least an argument for it, states may be correct in their apparent lack of
concern over the matter. Yet the language of the treaty provision—“[t]he courts of the State which carried out the seizure
may decide upon the penalties to be imposed.”157—remains susceptible to reasonable arguments against transfers.
A simple and straightforward interpretation suggests that
the second clause of the commentary (“[t]his right cannot be ex153. Kontorovich, supra note 5, at 183.
154. Press Release, supra note 28.
155. E.g., Mission, EU NAVFOR SOM., http://www.eunavfor.eu/about-us/
mission/?article2pdf=1 (last visited Apr. 29, 2011) (citing UNCLOS as its “Legal Basis” in support of its operating procedures relying on suspect transfers).
156. INT’L L. COMM’N, supra note 10, art. 43 cmt.
157. UNCLOS, supra note 6, art. 105; High Seas, supra note 49, art. 43.
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ercised at a place under the jurisdiction of another State”) refers to the right of states to seize pirate ships on the high seas,
and thus merely reiterates UNCLOS article 100.158 Such an interpretation ignores the strong possibility that “and” conjunctively gives only the capturing state the right to have pirate
ships adjudicated by its courts. The right to seize includes the
right to adjudicate, neither of which can occur in another
state’s territory. In the case of seizure, a capturing state cannot
violate another’s territorial sovereignty. In the case of adjudication, another state cannot exercise this right in place of the
capturing state. The fact that the commission chose not to use
“or”—which would give any state the right to adjudicate piracy
allegations, regardless of who captured the suspects—supports
this possibility. Policy matters such as the need to prevent the
mishandling of evidence, which becomes more likely during a
transfer, might support the ban as well. The Geneva LOS drafters may have also written the article with a mind to protecting
the rights of suspects against refoulement, the transfer of persons to a state in which they might be tortured.159
States fighting piracy in the Gulf of Aden can address
these policy concerns through multilateral agreements, and
careful respect for due process, without completely eschewing
the practice of transferring piracy suspects. Some scholars suggest that Security Council Resolution 1851 that authorizes shiprider agreements160 cures the transfer prohibition altogether.161
Shiprider agreements permit law enforcement officers to sail on
board ships flying the flag of another state, and to arrest pirates interdicted by those ships with the authority of their own
state.162 No available evidence indicates that states currently
use this authorization. The hope that shipriders could solve the
UNCLOS capturing-state requirement constitutes yet another
avoidance tactic. Placing an officer from one of the few states
158. Roach, supra note 89, at 404 (citing MYRES S. MCDOUGAL & WILLIAM
T. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS: A CONTEMPORARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 877 (1962)).
159. See Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment arts. 2–3, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
160. S.C. Res. 1851, supra note 106, ¶ 5.
161. E.g., Isanga, supra note 93, at 1276.
162. See, e.g., Eugene Kontorovich, Beyond the Article I Horizon: Congress’s
Enumerated Powers and Universal Jurisdiction over Drug Crimes, 93 MINN. L.
REV. 1191, 1202 (2009) (“[T]he ‘shiprider’ program[ is] where a law enforcement officer from one country embarks on the other’s vessels, carrying the authority to board and make arrests in the name of his home state.”).
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willing to prosecute suspected pirates on each naval ship patrolling the Gulf of Aden would present massive financial and
logistical challenges. Patrolling the ocean is expensive enough
without cruisers and destroyers having to make port to pick up
officers from the Seychelles, for example. Multiplying the jurisdiction of ships avoids the real legal problem surrounding the
relevance of UNCLOS as customary international law.
Furthermore, this proposal still fails to cure the UNCLOS
prohibition. article 105 does provide that “every State may
seize a pirate ship.”163 This suggests that a shiprider acting as
an agent of her state can arrest pirates, bring them to court,
and dodge the difficult issues UNCLOS would otherwise
present. Yet article 107 clarifies that only warships can make
seizures.164 The “State” referred to in article 105 thus means
the flag state of the ship making the interdiction, not the state
represented by the individual actor making arrests. Trying
suspected pirates in the courts of the shiprider’s state would
still violate UNCLOS article 105.
Despite the law of the sea provisions, capturing states that
transfer suspects to another state can do so legally under a
number of legal regimes. Indeed, “sufficient legal authority” exists.165 Universal jurisdiction, as mentioned above, allows any
state to capture and try suspected pirates. This could arguably
include one state who conducts the capture and another the
trial. Universal jurisdiction statutes generally provide jurisdiction over any specified illegal acts, not only acts for which the
state itself apprehended the accused.166
While universal jurisdiction remains a viable option, a
transfer would not always require the receiving state to use it.
A state with stronger ties to an act of piracy could avoid these
questions by exercising its jurisdiction extraterritorially. For
example, the state of which the suspected pirates are citizens
could rightfully request a capturing state with no additional
ties to the crime to turn over custody of the suspects.167 The
163. UNCLOS, supra note 6, art. 105.
164. Id. art. 107.
165. Id.
166. See, e.g., Merchant Shipping Act, (2009) Cap. 4 § 371 (Kenya) (“Any
person who commits any act of piracy; in territorial waters, commits any act of
armed robbery against ships shall be liable, upon conviction, to imprisonment
for life.”).
167. A rare actual example of this occurred between the German and Dutch
governments. See Pirate Who ‘Wanted to Kill Americans’ Gets 33 Years for Hijacking U.S. Ship, MSNBC.COM, Feb. 16, 2011, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/
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SUA provides jurisdiction for some piracy offenses in which
state parties establish a nexus to the action through extraterritoriality. Additionally, many states have statutes permitting
them to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction over piracy.168
None of these laws require the capturing state to retain custody
and try the suspects in its courts, and each provides it with
flexible and efficacious options for dealing with them.
Transfers based on either form of jurisdiction would also
adequately address any policy concerns surrounding the transfer proscription. Even a receiving state that exercises universal
jurisdiction will have a sophisticated court system sufficient to
handle complex evidence and even conduct further investigation itself when necessary. The actual agreement between
Kenya and the EU carefully outlines how the parties must
handle evidence.169 As evidenced by the title of that document,
it also takes care to prevent the possibility of refoulement, specifically mentioning a focus of the agreement on the treatment
of transferred suspects. Future agreements between other
states, and even the larger comprehensive regional agreements
on piracy advocated for by many scholars,170 should include
similar provisions. Ensuring proper transfer procedures would
obviate the need for an overbroad ban on all transfers.
The policies behind this supposed ban may also give way to
more significant concerns. The threat to the continued relevance of UNCLOS as a reflection of customary law might encourage its state parties to drop the ban in order to avoid jeopardizing their monumental agreement. Although one might
argue that the right to fair trial and freedom from torture of
captured pirates outweighs this concern, permitting flexible
responses to piracy unhindered by the transfer ban will prevent
harm to other individuals. The threat piracy poses to international security, and the loss of life caused by pirates, also override policy arguments in support of ban. Current state practices
support this view.
No state that has conducted a transfer has clearly stated
that it has done so under the widely recognized and historically
foundational principles of universal jurisdiction, or in order to
id/41615693/ns/us_news-crime_and_courts (“[T]he Dutch extradited 10 alleged
pirates to Germany to stand trial for trying to seize a German cargo ship.”).
168. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 7 (2001) (defining the special territorial and maritime
jurisdiction of the United States).
169. Exchange of Letters, supra note 112.
170. E.g., Skaridov, supra note 35, at 496.
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permit a trial in a state with the strongest jurisdictional nexus.
Undertaking what ought to be an acceptable—though not
ideal—practice in this way fails to establish clear state practices based on justifiable interpretations of international law. It
simply skirts these issues because they are “complex.” If the
complexity lies in law of the sea provisions that the drafters interpreted in a manner contradictory to universal jurisdiction,
SUA’s “punish or extradite” provisions,171 and current practices, then states must acknowledge that fact and commit to endorsing the internationally acceptable bases of the authority for
antipiracy activities.
III. ESTABLISHING A FRAMEWORK FOR ADDRESSING
PIRACY TODAY REQUIRES CLEAR LAWS AND LEGAL
PRIORITIES
Comprehensive responses to modern piracy problems, in
the face of difficult but approachable legal challenges, require a
clear legal framework for assessing and prioritizing the competing forces at issue. Although most of the relevant international
legal instruments and domestic precedents provide reasonably
discernable direction as to the salient factors states must assess when approaching this problem, defeating the modern piracy threat will require states to apply these in a uniform response with unambiguous guidelines. Such a response must
consider the interactions between universal and extraterritorial
jurisdiction; the SUA, UNCLOS, and Geneva LOS Conventions;
and piracy’s place in history in order to prescribe necessary
changes in law and state practices. Consistent action by all
states involved will require a framework by which to assess
competing claims to jurisdiction, which will necessarily call for
reinterpretation of the law of the sea conventions.
A. THIRD-PARTY STATES’ EXERCISE OF TRUE UNIVERSAL
JURISDICTION
Consistent with historical rhetoric decrying pirates as hostis humanis generis, the modern piracy challenge requires the
exercise of universal jurisdiction in some cases. The transfers of
suspected pirates to Kenya or other third parties—which have
not yet possessed stronger claims to jurisdiction at the time of
capture than Somalia or other states—reflect as much. However, transferring and receiving states do not adequately justify
171. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts, supra note 99, art. 7.
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their actions. Sufficient legal justification in both international
and domestic laws exists to do so.
Critics of this practice may argue that universal jurisdiction for piracy does not enjoy concrete precedential support.172
Jurisdiction in the United States over a suspected pirate or act
of piracy historically required some nexus.173 Even one of the
United States’ first antipiracy statutes provided no jurisdiction
for robbery at sea without links to U.S. territory or citizens.174
Some argue that universal jurisdiction should not play a role in
maritime piracy because it violates due process and state sovereignty, and has the potential to cause international tensions.175
The due process concerns, however, rest on the fear of inadequate notice about which state’s laws will apply to captured pirates. And even the pirates themselves claim to have notice of
the relevant laws as they boast of their own impunity.176 Moreover, the Internet now provides global access to the relevant
treaties and court practices. At the current stage in the struggle against modern piracy, perpetrators have adequate notice.
States exerting judicial power over foreign citizens who did
not put themselves at the mercy of their laws do so over the sovereign interest of that citizen’s country. For example, Belgium
repealed its universal jurisdiction statute after significant international backlash.177 In the piracy context, however, states
appear more eager to outsource prosecution than to pursue any
sovereign interests against suspects. The concern that exercising universal jurisdiction over accused pirates could foment international tensions ignores the fact that the U.N. Security
Council, NATO, the EU, and several Asian and African states
actively involve their diplomats, navies, and courts in the fight
against piracy. The world has united around this problem since
the tensions argument first surfaced. Stronger legal justifications for applying universal jurisdiction in this context also exist.
172. E.g., Goodwin, supra note 21, at 984.
173. See Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 8, 1 Stat. 113.
174. Id.; see also United States v. Furlong, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat) 184, 188
(1820); United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat) 610, 621 (1818); United
States v. Kessler, 26 F. Cas. 766, 768 (C.C.D. Pa. 1829).
175. E.g., Goodwin, supra note 21, at 1004.
176. See Gettleman, supra note 148 (“Even if foreign navies nab some
members of his crew, [the pirate] said, he is not worried . . . . ‘We know international law,’ [he] said.”).
177. JEFFREY L. DUNOFF ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW, NORMS, ACTORS,
PROCESS: A PROBLEM-ORIENTED APPROACH 691–92 (2d ed. 2006).
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One justification might suggest that, despite the evidence
that states traditionally exercise true universal jurisdiction in
theory only, some recognition of it in appropriate piracy cases
could be a positive development. Somalia would not likely challenge, for example, Kenya’s trial and detention of Somali nationals because the TFG has demonstrated an inclination to
cooperate internationally.178 Kenya’s discretionary application
of its universal jurisdiction statute179 could significantly reduce
the number of pirate attacks around Somali waters by facilitating antipiracy enforcement and deterrence. It fulfills a very
real need to create local deterrents to illegal actions.180 It aligns
with the historical rhetoric, though arguably not practice, that
piracy is a universally punishable crime. Furthermore, since
the international community construed the availability of universal jurisdiction for piracy as a justification for extending it
to genocide and such,181 actually vindicating this original purpose lends a previously absent credibility to the foundation of
modern, universally cognizable offenses. Looking forward, such
practices can build a credible deterrent to illegal acts of piracy.
B. LONG-TERM PRIORITIES MUST INFORM CONSISTENT,
UNIFIED ACTION
Applying universal jurisdiction to pirates serves its original purpose to provide a reliable legal response to crimes that
harm all nations.182 However, states currently overlook too
many other factors when they use it as their default mechanism in order to avoid the ostensible complexities of international law and piracy. Transfers to states that will exercise universal jurisdiction should be permissible, but this should not
remain the primary and preferred course of action. There must
be limits to universal jurisdiction. The lack of real precedent
applying universal jurisdiction in piracy cases should caution
178. S.C. Res. 1851, supra note 106; S.C. Res. 1816, supra note 28.
179. Merchant Shipping Act, (2009) Cap. 4 § 371 (Kenya) (“Any person who
commits any act of piracy; in territorial waters, commits any act of armed robbery against ships shall be liable, upon conviction, to imprisonment for life.”).
180. James Kraska, Developing Piracy Policy for the National Strategy for
Maritime Security, in LEGAL CHALLENGES IN MARITIME SECURITY, supra note
35, at 331, 358 (“This type of local action is particularly beneficial . . . .”).
181. See supra notes 67–71 and accompanying text.
182. See Stephanos Bibas & William W. Burke-White, International Idealism Meets Domestic-Criminal-Procedure Realism, 59 DUKE L.J. 637, 645
(2010) (“Thus, international criminal law originated with universal jurisdiction over piracy, the quintessential transnational crime.”).
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states into applying it only as a last resort, to deter criminals
who assume their own impunity. Rather than transferring suspected pirates to an uninvolved third party that will apply its
universal jurisdiction statue, states must agree to establish
clear preferences that allow those with the strongest jurisdictional claims to exercise them first.
Indeed, this is the logic behind the concept of extraterritorial jurisdiction.183 Even the SUA convention’s differentiation
between requiring parties to establish territorial and nationality jurisdiction, while permitting discretionary jurisdiction in
cases of passive personality or protective principles, reflects an
ordinal jurisdictional preference based on the strength of a
nexus.184 Different forms of jurisdiction exist in order to permit
states with weaker links to prosecute serious crimes when they
must. They are not meant to facilitate prosecution in the most
convenient venue.185
In terms of piracy in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean,
Somalia should have an opportunity to establish jurisdiction
over offenses involving its nationals. Actors and commentators
in this struggle against piracy recognize the fact that a real solution to the problem lies in strengthening Somali institutions.186 Allowing the TFG in Somalia to play a role in punishing its own citizens will provide a much-needed measure of
legitimacy to its government, and can effectively address this
problem at its root. A successful international response must
place this at the top of its priorities, and recognize that Somalia
will possess the strongest jurisdictional claims in the majority
of piracy cases.
Valid doubts about Somalia’s ability to effectively engage
this problem abound. Reports indicate that current efforts at
imprisoning those convicted of piracy in Somalia have experienced some failings.187 However, capacity-building partner183. See Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts, supra note 99,
art. 6 (outlining the bases of obligatory and discretionary jurisdiction, which
reflect stronger and weaker connections to the alleged crime, respectively).
184. See Glen Plant, The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 39 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 27, 45–46
(1990).
185. Telephone Interview with Eugene Kontorovich, Professor, Nw. Univ.
Law Sch. (Nov. 6, 2009).
186. E.g., Kaplan, supra note 3.
187. Judge Shot Dead in Somalia, AL JAZEERA, Nov. 12, 2009, http://
english.aljazeera.net/news/africa/2009/11/20091112125358501502.html (reporting the fatal shooting of a judge who had convicted pirates and members of the
al-Shabab rebel group).
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ships to support the rule of law will bolster local civil capital
and strengthen legitimacy at the grass-roots level by providing
positive results in Somali coastal communities.188 Current collaboration between the Western naval forces and legitimate
Somali law enforcement appear to have experienced some success.189 Moreover, doubts about the efficacy or even existence of
a court system in parts of the country ignore reports that some
courts in Somalia are trying, convicting, and imprisoning pirates.190 While information about these trials and detentions is
scarce, there are no documented reports of refoulement or corporal punishments under Shari’ah law.
Placing trial in Somalia at an equal level of preference to
trial in the territory of the capturing state, within the quantitative capacity of its courts, will thus facilitate the goal of addressing piracy at its root causes. No other methods currently
practiced or suggested can as completely accomplish this goal.
Transfers to states exercising universal jurisdiction are neither
swift nor certain—because of time required for transfer and
significant backlogs of many developing world courts—and thus
fail to provide an adequate deterrent in Somalia.191 Trials by
the capturing state may have similar shortcomings because of
the time required to bring in suspects and witnesses.192
Alternatively, commentators have called for the creation of
a regional or international piracy tribunal.193 This would not
solve any of the major problems causing piracy or impairing
188. See Kaplan, supra note 3.
189. NATO Works with Somali Authorities, OPERATION OCEAN SHIELD
(Sept. 24, 2009), http://www.manw.nato.int/page_operation_ocean_shield.aspx#
NATO_works_with_Somali_authorities.
190. Jeffrey Gettleman, Rounding Up Suspects, The West Turns to Kenya
as Piracy Criminal Court, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2009, at A8, available at 2009
WLNR 7699213 (“[I]n Somalia, a stable legal framework doesn’t exist.”); cf. Jehad Nga, Somalia’s Face of Modern Piracy, TIME.COM, Nov. 12, 2008, http://
www.time.com/time/photogallery/0,29307,1858572,00.html (documenting the
imprisonment of pirates in Somalia through photographs); Pirate Ringleader
Faces Execution in Somalia, BBC NEWS, Sept. 28, 2010, http://www.bbc.co.uk/
news/world-africa-11426560.
191. Caninas, supra note 38, at 19–20.
192. Kontorovich, supra note 90, at 265; see also James Kraska & Brian
Wilson, Fighting Pirates: The Pen and the Sword, 25 WORLD POL’Y J. 41, 45–
46 (2008), available at http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/wopj
.2009.25.4.41?.
193. See Craig Thedwall, Choosing the Right Yardarm: Establishing an International Court for Piracy, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 501, 517 (2010); Medvedev
Calls for Piracy Tribunal, RADIO NETH. WORLDWIDE (Nov. 20, 2009), http://
www.rnw.nl/english/article/medvedev-calls-pirate-tribunal.

2316

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[95:2285

responses to it. The expense and time required to build and establish a facility with judges, prosecutors, and staff could more
effectively go to strengthening existing institutions in Somalia
or Kenya, where European donors have in fact applied such resources.194 The domestic courts of interested states are capable
of trying suspected pirates,195 and with continued progress they
can acquire an equal or better capacity to fulfill this role by the
time an international court could be established. Even if creating an international tribunal became a viable option, the problem of surrendering custody of suspects will remain with the
UNCLOS prohibition on transfers still in place.
If—after a thorough analysis of the relevant laws,
precedent, and policies—states agree that a series of best practices can include transfers to uninterested parties in some instances, then they must consider the ramifications of that
choice for UNCLOS. Pursuing this course of action despite the
possibility that UNCLOS prohibits it,196 without amending or
distinguishing the convention, could significantly undermine
its status. Simple remedies exist. An advisory opinion by the
ITLOS clarifying the matter could suffice as a binding decision
on state parties.197 The tribunal could determine that UNCLOS
poses no barrier to transfers of suspected pirates, perhaps under certain conditions. If it decided otherwise, state parties
could add reservations, understandings, or declarations to their
signing and ratification. Barring these avenues of recourse,
state parties could propose an amendment to the text of article
105 itself.198 Changing the language of that provision would
nullify the effect of the commission’s commentary. Such
amendments might include language similar to SUA’s punish
or extradite provision. They might add to the current clause allowing the courts of the capturing state to determine punishment by also allowing it to determine whether to punish or
extradite to a state with a stronger jurisdictional claim.

194. See Gettleman, supra note 190, at A8.
195. See, e.g., Indictment, supra note 132.
196. See INT’L L. COMM’N, supra note 10, art. 43 cmt.
197. Rules of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea art. 138,
Mar. 17, 2009, ITLOS/8 (enacted pursuant to UNCLOS, supra note 6, Annex
VI, art. 16)(“The Tribunal may also give an advisory opinion on a legal question if an international agreement related to the purposes of the Convention
specifically provides for the submission to the Tribunal of a request for such
an opinion.”).
198. UNCLOS, supra note 6, arts. 312–15.
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From the eventual resolution of this matter, several positive developments would result. Making UNCLOS compatible
with state practice and the other related instruments would
promote the creation of clear legal guidelines for addressing piracy. Such guidelines would enable swift and effective punishment for convicted pirates in order to provide an effective deterrent for other would-be pirates. Stemming the creation of
new pirates while imprisoning the current ones would eventually stop the growing trend of pirate attacks in the waters off
Somalia. This would further prevent terrorist groups from
making inroads to this lucrative and dangerous criminal enterprise, making seamen and other civilians safer. Increased safety will result in reduced loss of life, injury, and pain and suffering of pirate victims and their families. Moreover, the creation
of an effective coordinated response to piracy based on such a
legal framework would ease the huge financial burdens this
problem imposes on shipping.
CONCLUSION
With the resurgence of piracy now raging off the coast of
Somalia, states must confront the unexpected challenges of applying new laws, which often overlap, and historic legal remedies to an ancient problem that now bears a modern face. The
very real costs that pirates exact on today’s international community render unacceptable purported solutions based on expedience rather than sound legal reasoning.
Lessons from the past can inform a comprehensive response. Such a response should necessarily include the current
vigorous military action and increased engagement with regional actors, in order to stifle acts of piracy both at their roots
and when they come to fruition. Most importantly, this collaboration must focus on the available legal tools such as extraterritorial and universal jurisdiction, and the UNCLOS and SUA
conventions. These instruments are tools, not hindrances, when
properly understood. Creating a mutually agreeable prioritization of jurisdiction, especially acknowledging the claims of
those states with the strongest links to the crime, will require
only a sober consideration of these factors. The potential benefits of a streamlined and truly effective mechanism for creating
consequences to violent criminal acts at sea far outweigh the
actual challenge of its creation.

